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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Sl A'J F OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
GOROON P. GRAVES 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19090 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Possession of a Stolen 
Motor Vehicle, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann, S 41-1-112 (1981). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In a bench trial held January 10, 1983, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding, appellant was tried and 
convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. On January 
26, 1983, appellant was sentenced to serve zero to five years 
in the Utah State Prison and fined $1,000 as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and 
'e·ntence imposed by the lower court. 
was arrested and was later charged with possesion of a stolen 
motur vehicle (R, 9: T. 7, 10, 12-13). 
At trial, Officer Lindsay testified that he did not 
l'ay much attention to the speed of the truck as he followed it 
(L 11). He assumed that it was only going about 20 or 25 
miles per hour (T. 11). And except at the truck stop, where 
appellant slowed down in the parking area, the officer did not 
recall seeing appellant speed up or slow down significantly 
during the time that he was being followed (T. 14-15). When 
asked if appellant had taken any evasive action during that 
period, the officer responded: "Not that I would -- unless he 
was trying to lose me in [the truck stop], which he was 
unsuccessful" (T. 15}. 
The truck that appellant was driving had been stolen 
from Asphalt sales Company (T. 4, 9). At trial, defense 
counsel stipulated that Asphalt Sales owned a 1982 GMC truck, 
license no. LC 1991: that it discovered its truck to be 
missing from its shop on May 15, 1982: that it did not know 
who had taken the vehicle: that no one was authorized to take 
the vehicle: and that appellant was neither known nor employed 
hy the personnel at Asphalt Sales ( T. 4}. 
The record does not indicate that appellant offered 
an explanation to officer Lindsay, at the time he was stopped 
by the latter on 2100 South, regarding his unauthorized 
r•rissession of the truck. Neither was any evidence adduced at 
t1ial to justify or explain that possession (T. 19). 
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Leuck in his possession, and (3) that appellant knew or had 
reasnn to believe that the truck was stolen. Appellant does 
not dispute that the first two elements of the crime were 
proved. The issue, then, is whether there was sufficient 
evidence adduced at trial to support a finding by Judge 
Wilkinson that appellant knew or had reason to believe that 
the truck he possessed was stolen. 
One acts with knowledge when he is aware of the 
nature of the existing circumstances. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(2) (1978). Since guilty knowledge, like intent, is 
a state of mind and is rarely capable of direct and positive 
proof, it may be inferred by the trier of fact from the 
actions of the defendant and from surrounding facts of 
circumstances. See State v. Murphy, Utah, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 
(1983): State v. Brooks, Utah, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (1981). 
With regard to permissible inferences, or 
presumptions of fact (as they are often called), the Court in 
State v. Brooks said: 
This Court has defined an "inference" as a 
logical and reasonable conclusion of the 
existence of a fact in a case, not 
presented by direct evidence as to the 
existence of the fact itself, but inferred 
from the establishment of other facts from 
which by a process of logic and reason, 
based upon common experience, the 
existence of the assumed fact may be 
concluded by the trier of fact. An 
inference does not disappear from a case 
but goes to the fact trier to be weighed 
along with the contravening evidence 
because all inferences, which are capable 
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Not only is it "deeply rooted in our law," id. at 
it is a rational inference. As indicated in United 
states v. Taylor, 334 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 469 
F.2d 284 ( 3d Cir. 1972): 
[T)he presumption of guilty knowledge 
that arises from recent possession of 
stolen goods is not statutory in origin, 
but is a long recognized rule of common 
law. It is supported by good sense and 
everyday experience: United States v. 
Coppola, 424 F.2d 991, 993 (2d Cir. l970). 
For centuries, unexplained possession of 
recently stolen property has been accepted 
as evidence of wrong-doing. As a 
permissible inference for the jury, it 
satisfies the requirements of due process: 
United States v. Johnson, 140 U.S. App. 
D.C. 54, 433 F.2d 1160, 1169 (1970). 
Id. at 1057 (emphasis added). And in case, the 
Court affirmed the court of Appeals' finding that there is no 
lack of "rational connection" between unexplained possession 
of recently stolen property and knowledge that the property is 
stolen. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 841, 843-846, 846 n.11. 
Statutory and case law in Utah also recognize the 
validity of the inference of guilty knowledge in such 
States, 165 u.s. 486, 502-503 (1897). Many state supreme 
courts have also upheld the use of this inference. 29 Am. 
Jr. 2d Evidences 229 (1967 & supp. 1983), and cases cited 
therein, cases fran nearby states which have so held include 
Wells v. People, 197 Colo. 350, 354-355, 592 P.2d 1321, 
1324-1325 (1979) (instruction on knowledge presumption of 
ancient vintage), Hughes v. State, 536 P.2d 990, 992-993 (Okla 
\rim. App. 1975) (per curiam); People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 
245, 258, 324 P.2d 556, 562 (1958); State v. Salzman, 186 
Wash, 44, 47, 56 P.2d 1005, 1007 ( 1936). 
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che c;ame with regard to burglary). Regarding the inference 
c(Jntained in the former larceny statute, the Kirkman Court 
observed: 
This statute has nothing to do with 
burglary and applies only to charges of 
stealing. However, one who has possession 
of recently stolen property would be faced 
with the situation of having adverse 
inferences drawn against him, and such 
inferences together with all the other 
evidence might be enough to convince a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was guilty of larceny even in 
the absence of the statute above quoted. 
The same adverse inference will 
confront a defendant in a burglary case 
where he has possession of recently stolen 
property which could have been obtained 
only by a burglarious entry into a 
building. There would be a duty upon the 
one in possession of such property to 
explain his possession if he is to remove 
that adverse inference against him 
pointing toward his guilt; and if he gives 
a false account of how he acquired that 
possession, or having a reasonable 
opportunity to show that his possession 
was honestly acquired he refuses or fails 
to do so, such conduct is a circumstance 
which may be considered by the jury along 
with all other evidence bearing upon the 
case in determining guilt or innocence. 
20 Utah 2d at 46, 432 P.2d at 638-639 (emphasis added). 
other jurisdictions have also extended the inference 
to robtery cases. v. People, 197 Colo, 350, 
354-355, 592 P.2d 1321, 1324-1325 (1979), and cases cited 
lherein. Still others have extended its application to cases 
of "receiving and possessing stolen property." 
fombs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 341 S.W.2d 774, 775 (1960) 
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Finally, that the inference may be validly drawn 
w1Lt1 regards to cases involving stolen vehicles is further 
evidenced by the federal courts' application of the inference 
in cases brought under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 
or Dyer Act [18 U.S.C. SS 2311-2313 (1982)). See 15 A.L.R. 
fed. 856 (1973 & Supp. 1983), and cases cited therein. 
Summarizing the law as applied in those cases, American Law 
Reports notes the following: 
[U)nexplained possession is deemed guilty 
possession ••• and this may serve to 
permit an inference that the possessor, 
whether or not he is shown to have been 
the thief, knew that the vehicle was 
stolen .• , • 
Id. at 859. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, for 
example, that 
possession by the defendant of the 
recently stolen automobile justifies the 
inference that the possession is guilty 
possession and may be of controlling 
weight unless explained by the 
circumstances or accounted for in some way 
consistent with innocence. [Seefeldt v. 
United States, 183 F.2d 713, 715 {10th 
Cir. 1950)). 
McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21, 25 n.3 (10th Cir. 
1964). See also Garrison v. United States, 353 F.2d 94, 95 
(10th Cir. 1965) (Utah case). The federal courts' application 
of this inference to cases involvina the possession of stolen 
mntor vehicles is logical and supports the conclusion that the 
inference should apply in cases prosecuted pursuant to similar 
laws, such as S 41-1-112. 
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1r,1, 459 P.2d 763 (1969). And, as recognized by this Court: 
[I]t is a fact of life that one in 
possession of stolen property who makes no 
explanation as to how he came in 
possession is apt to be under some adverse 
consideration as to his honesty; and if he 
has an explanation as to how he 
innocently came into possession of the 
stolen property, he would certainly 
improve his situation by giving his 
account of how it happened to the [trier 
of fact] • 
State v. Murphy, Utah, 617 P.2d 399, 405 (1980). 
Fourth, appellant was found drivino the truck less 
than two months after it had disappeared from the owner's 
place of business (T. 4, 6-7, 13-14, 19l and thus was in 
possession of recently stolen property. See State v. Merritt, 
67 Utah at 335-336, 247 P. at 501 (four months was not "of 
such length as to take the case out of the category of 
'property recently stolen'"); United States v. Robertson, 417 
F.2d 873, 878 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) (the shorter the period 
between the theft and defendant's possession, the stronger the 
inference of guilt). 
Under these circumstances, the trial judge could 
properly have inferred that appellant knew that the truck he 
was stolen, and having found that element, concluded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had violated 
s 4]-1-112. 
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence supportino a conviction, this Court has applied 
-13-
